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Abstract - The sociological literature on social networks 
emphasizes by and large positive network effects. 
Negative effects of such networks are discussed rather 
rarely. This paper tackles negative effects by applying 
economic theory, particularly neoclassical theory, new 
institutional theory and the results from experimental 
economics to the concept of social networks. In the 
paper it is assumed that social networks are exclusive 
and since exclusiveness affects the allocation of 
resources, negative external effects may occur. The 
argument of the paper is that it is not only advantages 
for network members that need to be investigated but 
also the disadvantages for non-network members. The 
results have two implications. The first one is for 
economic policy, which often fosters social networking 
while ignoring their negative externalities. The second 
one is for network research that can benefit from a 
more rigorous application of economic theories. 
 
Keywords - social networks, network effect, network 
externality, transaction costs, negative effects 
1. Introduction 
Social networks have become a core topic 
among others in social sciences in the last decades. 
Social network theory was one of the sociologists‘ 
answers to new institutionalism which emerged in 
economics some decades ago. Granovetter‘s seminal 
work on embeddedness of social action [1] attacks 
economists‘ views on markets and on hierarchies 
[2][3][4][5] alike [6][7]. The concepts of social 
embeddedness of individual action and of social 
networks have been the battle horse for New 
Economic Sociology since the mid-1980s [8]. Apart 
from science, these concepts have also gained 
considerable support on the political arena. Political 
organizations such as the EU provide incentives—
mainly in the form of monetary subsidizing—
fostering networking of individuals, e.g. 
entrepreneurs or researchers. Some politicians 
apparently expect that positive effects of social 
networks emerge also for groups other than network 
members. For instance, social networks may speed 
up the production and flow of knowledge and other 
goods in a society. Negative effects of social 
networks are largely ignored both in the sociological 
literature and by political actors. Yet, negative effects 
may emerge not only for network members, but also 
for non-network members and for societies at large. 
In this paper the focus is on such negative effects of 
social networks. The aim of the paper is to address 
this deficit and to add critical thoughts to the ongoing 
discussion on social networks, which we consider 
biased and in favour of positive network effects. 
A social network (SN) is formed by individuals 
connected by links. A SN can have a horizontal or 
vertical structure
1
, for instance between buyers and 
sellers in a market. A SN is not complete so that not 
all individuals in a society are members. Thus a SN is 
exclusive by definition. Examples are networks of 
entrepreneurs who share factor inputs ([9] for 
industrial districts), networks of scientists who 
exchange knowledge [10][11], networks of workers 
who set up a trade union, networks of consumers or 
sellers (e.g., [12][13][14]). A common feature of SN 
is that they influence markets: the market for 
consumer goods is influenced by entrepreneurs‘ 
decisions to collude, the market for scientific goods 
is influenced by scientific networks, trade unions 
influence the labour market and organized consumer 
groups influence prices and quality of products. The 
decision to form and to contribute to a SN does not 
merely affect the well-being of those individuals who 
are in the network but also the well-being of non-




In economics, the terms ‗network effect‘ and 
‗network externality‘ are often used interchangeably 
[15]. Liebowitz and Margolis [16] identify a network 
externality as a network effect that allows realizing 
additional gains through network participation (cf. 
also [15]). The presence of a network externality 
implies that decisions of certain individuals influence 
the well-being of others either directly or indirectly. 
Katz and Shapiro [17] coined the term network 
externality and referred to it mainly as positive 
consumption externalities (cf. additionally [18][19]). 
                                                          
1 A SN may have the form of a star, a circle or a Y. 
2 Negative effects also occur for network members. The spread of 
a computer virus or of diseases is much faster if actors are linked 
than if they are not. Compare [23] who refers to the epidemiology 
literature and formalizes in a model the spread of infections in 
networks. See also [24] for a model on the spread of 
(mis)information in networks. 
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For instance, if many individuals decide to purchase 
the same telecommunication service, communication 
among these individuals is facilitated and a positive 
network effect occurs [20]. The term network 
externality hints at the existence of a market failure 
[21]. As in the communication example, network 
effects and externalities are discussed most often for 
the demand side of an economy but they are also 
prevalent for the supply side (cf. [15] for a recent 
review on empirical findings). In this paper the focus 
on SN is on the supply side. The consequence of 
negative effects is that (certain) non-members of SN 
experience losses, while those in the SN experience 
gains (cf. e.g., [22]). 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the 
second section traditional economic theory which 
does not deal with institutions is used. Although this 
theory suffers from a shortcoming when applied to 
real life situations, it serves well as a reference point 
of efficient allocations and also explains why 
individuals could have an incentive to set up a SN. In 
the third chapter SN are considered as institutions in 
the sense of New Institutional Economics. As 
institutions, SN compete with alternative institutions 
for the allocation and distribution of resources. Since 
all institutions are related to specific transaction 
costs, different costs emerge if different institutions 
are used as allocation mechanisms. For the analysis 
the focus is on the transaction cost theory. In the 
fourth section the empirical results of network theory 
as found in experimental economics are discussed. 
The fifth section concludes. 
 
2. Neoclassical Economics 
Traditional theory implies the assumption of 
perfect markets and rational individuals. These 
assumptions help to identify efficient allocation of 
resources. In a model with a demand and a supply 
function a market clearing price and the related 
quantity in equilibrium are determined. Any 
distortions from this equilibrium lead to inefficient 
situations. Under the assumption of a perfectly 
competitive market, however, distortions do not 
occur. The rational individual is an optimizing agent 
with perfect foresight, for simplicity we may think of 
an egoist who maximizes material utility and is 
perfectly informed. As a starting point, this model 
can help us to illustrate negative effects of networks. 
However, few economists restrict their thoughts 
to the perfectly competitive model. Instead, it is 
reasonable to assume that market distortions are 
possible. For example, we may think of an oligopoly 
which constitutes a collusion of suppliers. Then 
market outcomes are inefficient as compared to the 
outcome in a model of perfect competition. 
Information asymmetries and information costs 
[25][26][27] are another reason for the emergence of 
inefficiencies and can account for a market failure. If 
it is assumed that asymmetries occur, then they will 
have an effect on rational individuals‘ optimizing 
behavior. Furthermore, rational individuals have an 
interest in creating and maintaining information 
asymmetries because these asymmetries facilitate 
higher gains (e.g., quasi-rents) than on a perfectly 
competitive market (cf. [28]). SN are related to 
information asymmetries. Since SN are exclusive, 
members of SN have different information from that 
of non-members. Rational individuals have an 
interest to replace or supplement the market as an 
allocation system through a SN because members are 
thus able to obtain individual gains. One of the 
consequences is that inefficiency occurs. If a SN is in 
place, non-members are worse off and the situation is 
Pareto inferior to the market situation. For instance, if 
a trade union organizes its members successfully, this 
SN may induce a wage rate above a market clearing 
wage with a possible consequence of an increasing 
unemployment rate in the industry. The situation with 
the SN in place may also be inferior according to the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion, i.e. if the aggregated wage 
gains of union members are insufficient to 
compensate the aggregate wage losses of those 
becoming unemployed. In this case a negative effect 
occurs for the society at large. 
Nonetheless, it is not ignored that in specific 
contexts setting up a SN may constitute a Pareto 
improvement. If a market does not exist and cannot 
be implemented (e.g., due to problems of adverse 
selection), then, despite the fact that demand and 
supply are positive, the equilibrium price and 
quantity in equilibrium are both zero. In this case the 
society is better off if exchange is initiated by a SN. 
This exchange is inefficient and discriminatory when 
compared with the equilibrium on a perfectly 
competitive market. It is, however, a Pareto 
improvement compared to a situation with zero 
exchange (cf. [29][30][31]). 
To sum up this section, the argument is that the 
neo-classical model of perfect competition with its 
underlying assumptions cannot explain the existence 
of or the necessity for SN. Nevertheless, the concept 
of optimizing individuals is central for the 
explanation of SN. More minimalist assumptions 
such as information asymmetries make it possible to 
explain why SN come into existence and why SN can 
be stable. Firstly, they come into existence because 
they offer a way to diminish information 
asymmetries among members, e.g. reputation 
mechanisms [32]. Secondly, some individuals are 
better off if they are in the SN because they are able 
to extract quasi-rents when barriers to entry exist. A 
shift away from a SN—coming closer to the model of 
perfect competition—would induce losses for 
network members. Thus, once a SN is in place, it 
could be costly to implement a market (cf. [33]). 
Thirdly, the model of perfect competition provides us 
with a reference point of an ideal case. With this 
reference point inefficiencies induced by SN can be 
identified. In the next section SN are related to New 
Institutional Economics which operates with a 
different set of assumptions. 
 
 




3. New Institutional Economics 
New Institutional Economics takes into account 
the existence not only of information asymmetries, 
but also of bounded rationality, path dependence, and 
institutions, preserving the assumption of optimizing 
(or at least satisfying, cf. [34]) individuals. 
Institutions are norms and behavioral rules, decision 
making systems, organizations [35] or their 
combinations. In this sense a SN is an institution. 
Institutions can emerge spontaneously [36] or are 
created by individuals [37] who, for instance, set the 
rules of entry or rules for communication (e.g., as 
―market-makers‖ [38]). This applies also for a SN. 
For analytical purposes it is helpful to employ the 
concept of transaction costs3 from New Institutional 
Economics‘, i.e. the costs of implementing and 
running an institution [39][40]. 
In this paper a distinction is made between the 
comparison of individual institutions on the one side 
and different structures of the same institution, on the 
other. The analysis starts with the comparison 
between individual institutions that serve the same 
aim. Transaction costs of these institutions can be 
contrasted—all other factors kept equal. A case in 
point is institutions that facilitate exchange such as 
markets, networks, or hierarchies. If transaction costs 
of markets are comparatively high but if a switch to 
an alternative institution with lower transaction cost 
is possible, then the situation is Pareto inefficient. 
Coase [41] explains the existence of the firm (as an 
institution) through lower transaction costs: specific 
processes bear lower transaction costs if a firm is 
used instead of market exchange. Another example is 
the institution of law. If law enforcement is not 
feasible due to high transaction costs, an alternative 
institution such as a SN can facilitate contract 
enforcement in specific environments at 
comparatively lower costs [42]. Closely related are 
problems of asymmetric information on markets, 
which may lead to adverse selection or moral hazard. 
The risks of falling victim to problems of information 
asymmetries can be reduced by SN [43][44]. These 
examples indicate that different institutions lead to a 
different size (but also a different kind) of transaction 
costs. 
In the SN transaction costs of exchange are often 
reduced by eliminating anonymity. Instead of 
anonymous relations, relational contracts among 
network members emerge. Relational contracts 
regulate repeated interaction and individuals are not 
anymore anonymous (as in traditional theory) but 
have an identity (cf. [45][46]). Reputation is created 
through repeated interaction of SN members. Shared 
network identity makes the occurrence of a contract 
violation less probable to occur because a violator‘s 
actions can be retaliated [42][1][47]. Consequently, a 
SN reduces insecurity over decisions of others 
because a SN limits the set of behavioral choices. In 
                                                          
3 For the implementation of the concept see [41] and [49]. 
this sense setting up and participation in a SN is an 
optimizing behavior under the assumption of 
bounded rationality (cf. [48]). 
 
Next, negative effects are examined. A 
differentiation between effects for non-members and 
for members of SN is made. Since SN are exclusive, 
non-members cannot influence processes within the 
network but are affected by the decisions of network 
members. A case in point is a reallocation of given 
resources in such a way that network members 
receive more and non-members less of these 
resources. Political processes in which successful 
lobbying or rent-seeking of a SN leads to a 
reallocation of resources is an example at hand (cf. 
additionally [50]). Cartels and collusions on product 
markets provide further examples (cf. additionally 
[51]). Consequences of a reallocation can be an 
increase in inequality (e.g., in income or educational 
opportunities). Another effect can be that SNs are a 
cause for unexploited gains from trade (cf. [47]) 
because the number of trade partners is limited to SN 





Apart from that, members can also be exposed to 
negative effects. Business networks that are based on 
common religious background of its members [52] 
are an illustration. While the SN itself is beneficial 
for some members it is not necessarily beneficial for 
all members. Particularly if an exit barrier does not 
allow members to leave a SN, those members who 
would be better-off without the SN have to stay as 
members. For instance, business environments exist 
where a business loan can only be received by 
network members. Such a situation may be beneficial 
for some but not for all individuals in the SN (see 
[53]). In such cases a limitation of the exchange 
partners to SN members causes a negative effect. 
Another case of networks with negative effects on 
members is the creation of knowledge in science 
discussed by Jackson and Wolinsky [54]. The authors 
provide a model in which a researcher is working on 
projects with different co-authors. Links connect the 
researcher and her co-authors. If the researcher 
decides to build up additional links with new co-
authors, her decision has a negative effect on the 
productivity of her already existing network. The 
model leads to the result that all previous co-authors 
are worse-off if the researcher decides to extend her 
network. The model hints at a set of specific 
problems: optimal network size and optimal network 
form. 
 
Finally, the question about the negative effects 
of SN in the long run is posed. From a game theoretic 
perspective an institution constitutes a Nash 
equilibrium [55], so does a SN. Since Nash equilibria 
can be inefficient, a SN can constitute such an 
inefficient equilibrium. Such an inefficient 
                                                          
4 For an evaluation of the net effects of SN the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion could be applied. 
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equilibrium can be observed if some members of the 
SN are worse-off compared to a situation without the 
SN, yet these members cannot exit the SN. In this 
case the SN is harmful because negative effects are 
not temporary but persistent over time. The concept 
of path dependence can explain the emergence of 
permanently inefficient SNs (cf. additionally [33]). 
Even when individuals are aware of negative SN 
effects, they cannot individually develop the 
institution to the better and collective action may be 
too costly to organize [50]. Consequently, 
inefficiency perpetuates. 
 
Since SN are causes for positive and negative 
effects on its members and on non-members, the 
question of net effects of SN is important. One option 
for measuring these effects is provided through 
economic experiments. In the next section the 
potential of the experimental approach is outlined. 
 
4. Experimental Economics 
The literature provides a large number of case 
studies of SN, e.g. in the journal of Social Networks 
and in journals related to industrial organization. A 
recent economic survey of empirical studies on 
networks is provided by [15]. This section briefly 
refers to such empirical studies conducted by using 
economic experiments
5
. Economic experiments 
permit collecting data in a controlled environment 
and the method is incentive-compatible, i.e. provides 
incentives for participants to exhibit their 
preferences. Another advantage of economic 
experiments is that they enable us to derive 
generalizations which go beyond specific case 
studies. 
 
Kosfeld [56] provides a survey of economic 
experiments related to networks. He distinguishes 
between four types of experiments on networks: 
coordination networks, cooperation networks, buyer-
seller networks, and network formation. None of the 
mentioned experiments in Kosfeld‘s survey explicitly 
investigates negative network effects. The empirical 
findings of the summarized experiments are partly in 
line with the predictions derived from economic 
theories, the results are partly inconclusive. In the 
next paragraph Kosfeld‘s results are summed up. 
 
First, experiments on networks in coordination 
games find out—by and large—that players converge 
to an efficient Nash equilibrium. Second, the results 
from experiments on cooperation in networks are 
inconclusive and are not always in line with 
theoretical predictions. Kosfeld‘s explanation of the 
results in these experiments is that learning from 
other players does not occur. Third, buyer-seller 
network experiments mainly center on specific 
simulated markets. Cassar et al. [61] have recently 
                                                          
5 Economic experiments have become a standard methodology in 
investigating decisions. For overviews on the method and on the 
main researched topics compare [57][58][59][60]. 
addressed the problem of non-enforceable contracts 
in trade. In their experiments they find out that the 
implementation of networks leads to increased 
efficiency. This finding supports the previously 
mentioned institutional theory that networks as 
institutions can lead to higher efficiency if market 
imperfections exist. Fourth, most network formation 
experiments are directly or indirectly related either to 
the theoretical work of Jackson and Wolinsky [54] 
who introduced the concept of pairwise stability of 
links in networks, i.e. a bilateral agreement to 
establish a link between actors is necessary, or Bala 
and Goyal [62] who use unilateral link formation. 
Receiving non-rival information is the main 
advantage for individuals to connect with other 
individuals in these network models. Furthermore, 
the models consider the costs of being connected. 
The models tackle the questions of optimal network 
form and network size. Experimental studies 
investigate whether the predicted Nash equilibria 
with respect to network form and size are played. The 
experimental results demonstrate that several aspects 
seem to have an influence on what is actually played. 
Risk and fairness perception are among these aspects. 
Mantovani et al. [63] have recently shown that agents 
in a network experiment behave ‗farsighted‘ 
(regarding future) with respect to the stability of a 
network. 
To sum up, at present the experimental studies 
on networks focus primarily on whether or not a 
theoretically predicted Nash equilibrium is played 
and on the factors that lead to the emergence of a 
Nash equilibrium. None of the experiments focuses 




 Furubotn and Richter [64] state that a thorough 
analysis of collective action in cases of organized 
group interests is still missing in economic research 
(but see [65]). Collective action is one of the strains 
of economic research that provides the appropriate 
analytical tools for revealing negative network 
effects. The very existence of SN is closely related to 
the aim of extracting rents [66][50]. According to 
Olson‘s [67][50] theory, the smaller the size of a 
group is, the more effective the organization of 
collective action among its members is, and hence 
the achievement of its goals. Thus exclusion from 
resources through non-membership in organized 
groups is a main feature of SN. Surprisingly, 
promoting SN has been adopted by international and 
national organizations as a standard policy tool. For 
instance, the European Union or national 
governments promote the emergence of scientific 
networks, of business clusters and other SN. The aim 
of such policies is to generate positive effects for 
members and non-members of the SN alike. 
However, negative effects caused by these SN are 
largely ignored (cf. [68] for SN in science). Taking 
these negative effects into consideration, a SN is not 
a cure for a problem but rather the cause of a disease. 
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Indeed it prevents a society from finding more 
efficient institutional arrangements to solve social 
issues. Once a SN is installed, it is difficult to replace 
it even if it is inefficient and even if its inefficiency is 
observable and known. Self-enforcing mechanisms of 
SN can lead to an increase of transaction costs and 
are able to hamper economic growth and social 
change, a process which Olson illustrated in a 
historical example as ‗institutional sclerosis‘. The 
conclusion is that the rather one-sided view—as often 
employed in social sciences and in policy—that SN 
exercise positive effects, is to be replaced by a more 
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